

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 15 MBFR VIENNA 0401

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF
JULY 4, 1978

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE JULY 4, 1978 INFORMAL
SESSION OF THE VIENNA TALKS, THE ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED
BY THE NETHERLANDS REP, UK REP, AND US DEPREP AND THE
EAST BY SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV, CZECHOSLOVAK REP
KEBLUSEK, AND GDR REP OESER. MILITARY ADVISORS WERE ALSO
PRESENT.

2. THE SESSION WAS A LENGTHY ONE. THE WEST CRITICIZED
THE EAST'S FAILURE TO TAKE THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR INTO
ACCOUNT IN THE JUNE 8 PROPOSALS AND THE EAST RESPONDED.
WESTERN REPS RAISED FURTHER QUESTIONS ON THE JUNE 8 PROPOSALS
WHICH TH EAST ALSO ANSWERED. THERE WAS A
DISCUSSION OF THE EAST'S PROPOSAL FOR PHASE II ARMAMENT

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REDUCTIONS, ON WHICH EASTERN REPS ALSO PRESENTED PREPARED
VIEWS. THERE WAS ALSO AN EXCHANGE OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
ON THE DATA ISSUE.

3. UK REP POINTED OUT THAT THE FACT THAT VARIOUS
PARTICIPANTS WERE AFFECTED IN DIFFERENT WAYS BY THEIR
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION MEANT THAT AN AGREEMENT WHICH IGNORED

GEOGRAPHY AND TREATED ALL PARTICIPANTS IN AN IDENTICAL MANNER WOULD AFFECT THE SECURITY OF PARTICIPANTS IN DIFFERENT WAYS. DESPITE THIS, IN THEIR JUNE 8 PROPOSALS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD CONTINUED TO TREAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS THOUGH THEY WERE IDENTICAL, DELIBERATELY DISREGARDING THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS. UK REP SHOWED HOW THE INTRINSIC DIFFICULTIES IN THE POSITION OF THE EAST REGARDING MANPOWER REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, MANPOWER CEILINGS, ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS AND REDUCTION BY UNITS WERE IN EACH CASE INTENSIFIED AND COMPOUNDED BY GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THE PROXIMITY OF THE SOVIET UNION WHOSE LARGE FORCES WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION OR LIMITATION.

4. TARASOV IN A LENGTHY IMPROMPTU RESPONSE SAID THAT SINCE THE WEST HAD NOT PROVEN ITS CONTENTIONS ABOUT DATA, THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR WAS IRRELEVANT TO THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS. AS REGARDS LIMITATIONS, THE WEST HAD ALWAYS STRESSED THE NEED FOR EACH SIDE TO BE IN A POSITION TO MAINTAIN ITS PERMITTED LEVEL OF MANPOWER. BUT THE NATIONAL LIMITS PROPOSED FOR THE SOVIETS COULD PREVENT THE EAST FROM MAINTAINING ITS AGREED LEVEL IF THE POLES AND CZECHOSLOVAKS REDUCED 40,000 MEN OR MORE. THIS POINT, TOO, HAD NO CONNECTION WITH THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR. AS REGARDS ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE II, UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL THE EAST

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WOULD IN FACT BE AT A DISADVANTAGE SINCE THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR ARMAMENTS FROM THE REA AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WOULD MERELY REDUCE ARMAMENTS OUT OF ACTIVE DUTY UNITS AND STORE THEM IN THE AREA. IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT SITUATION, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE OBLIGED TO BRING BACK THE WITHDRAWN ARMAMENTS INTO THE REDUCTION AREA. THE WEST OPPOSED UNIT REDUCTIONS FOR WESTERN EUROPEANS BUT WAS DEMANDING THAT THE SOVIETS REDUCE IT DIVISIONS. THIS ISSUE TOO HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH GEOGRAPHY.

5. UK REP STATED THAT TARASOV HAD NOT DEALT WITH THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR IN HIS REMARKS NOR HAD TARASOV ATTEMPTED TO ANSWER EARLIER WESTERN CRITICISMS OF THE MECHANISM PROPOSED BY THE EAST FOR MAINTAINING THE COMMON CEILING LEVEL ON EACH SIDE.

6. IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN QUESTIONS, TARASOV APPEARED TO CONFIRM THAT ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS ENVISAGED UNDER THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD CONSIST OF TAKING ARMAMENTS OUT OF ACTIVE DUTY UNITS AND STORING THEM IN THE AREA. A NUMERICAL LIMIT WOULD BE PLACED ON THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT IN BOTH ACTIVE DUTY UNITS

AND STORAGE. TARASOV POINTED OUT THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH CALLED ONLY FOR REDUCTION OF SPECIFIED ARMAMENTS AND THAT OTHER ARMAMENTS COULD INCREASE. LIMITATIONS WOULD COVER ONLY THOSE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS SUBJECT TO REDUCTION.

7. NETHERLANDS REP ASKED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF JUNE 8 AND REPLIED TO EARLIER

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EASTERN QUESTIONS ON WESTERN DATA.

8. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION BY NETHERLANDS REP
TARASOV SAID SOVIET PHASE I MANPOWER REDUCTIONS EQUIVALENT TO ONE
TANK DIVISION WOULD CONSIST NOT ONLY OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE TANK
UNITS OUTSIDE THE TWO DIVISIONS BUT ALSO OF THE CORPS HEAD-
QUARTERS AND ITS ASSOCIATED UNITS. THE INFANTRY COMBAT
VEHICLES WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW WOULD BE BMPS.
THE EAST HAD IN MIND LIMITING ONLY THOSE MILITARY POSITIONS
WHICH COULD BE FILLED EITHER BY MILITARY PERSONNEL OR
CIVILIANS. THE NUMBER OF SUCH CIVILIANS SHOULD NOT BE
INCREASED. THE EAST'S PROPOSAL DID NOT SPECIFICALLY PRO-
VIDE OR REQUIRE REDUCTION OF FURTHER US AND SOVIET ARMAMENTS
IN PHASE II. BUT THIS COULD BE NEGOTIATED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT
IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL DID NOT REQUIRE THAT
PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY THE US WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF BRIGADES AND

THE SOVIETS IN THE FORM OF DIVISIONS BUT THE EAST ADHERED
TO THE VIEW THAT THOSE REDUCTIONS TOO SHOULD BE IN THE FORM
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OF UNITS AND SUBUNITS.

9. CZECHOSLIVAK REP STATED THAT THE EASTERN POSITION
ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARMAMENTS REPRESENTED AN IMPORTANT
MOVE TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITIONS. THE PROPOSED WITH-
DRAWAL OF 1,000 SOVIET TANKS WAS A REDUCTION OF GREAT
MILITARY SUBSTANCE WHOSE SIGNIFICANCE WAS INCREASED BY
PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF WESTERN
TANKS AND BY THE DOUBTS ABOUT THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE
PROPOSED US NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD
EXPRESSED. THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE WEST AND EAST ON
ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS WAS THE PARTICIPATION OF WESTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA IN ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS.
CZECHOSLOVAK REP ASKED WHETHER THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
AND CANADA WERE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE ON REDUCTION OF THEIR
ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II OR WHETHER THEY WOULD IN PHASE II
NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE THEIR OPPOSITION TO ARMAMENT REDUC-
TIONS, LEAVING THE US AS THE SOLE WESTERN COUNTRY TO REDUCE
ITS ARMAMENTS.

10. THE GDR REP ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF THE TREATMENT OF
AIR FORCES IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. THE EAST'S RELINQUISH-
MENT OF ITS REQUIREMENT FOR AIR FORCES MANPOWER REDUCTION
HAD BEEN A MAJOR CONCESSION. AIR FORCE MANPOWER WOULD
EITHER HAVE TO BE FROZEN AT ITS LEVEL AT THE TIME WHEN THE
AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED OR, BY AGREEMENT, IT COULD BE INCREASED
TO FILL OUT THE COMMON CEILING OF 200,000 MEN. AS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE COLLECTIVE LIMITATIONS OF AIR MANPOWER PRO-
POSED BY THE EAST UNDER THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS, INDIVI-
DUAL PARTICIPANTS COULD INCREASE THEIR AIR FORCE MANPOWER
IN THE EVENT OF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF AIR FORCES MANPOWER
BY ITS OTHER ALLIES. THE 50 PERCENT RULE WOULD APPLY.
THIS COULD BE DONE AS LONG AS THE COMBINED TOTAL OF AIR

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AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS DID NOT
EXCEED THEIR PRE-REDUCTION LEVELS.

11. US DEP REP ASKED FURTHER QUESTIONS ON EASTERN DATA
AND TARASOV ASKED FURTHER QUESTIONS ON WESTERN DATA,
ONCE AGAIN RAISING EASTERN REQUEST FOR WESTERN ESTIMATES
OF FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL WARSAW PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

12. UK REP AS HOST WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, UK REP SAID THAT THERE WERE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THESE DIFFERENCES HAD TO BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT IF EAST AND WEST WERE TO ACHIEVE AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT. AMBASSADOR KEBLUSEK, AT THE JUNE 15 PLENARY SESSION, HAD STATED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL "PLACES ALL THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE AGREEMENT IN AN IDENTICAL SITUATION". THIS STATEMENT WAS THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM. FROM THE WESTERN VIEWPOINT, THE EFFECTS OF GEOGRAPHY HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FRAMING THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY PARTICIPANTS.

13. UK REP STATED THAT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT DEALING WITH AN UNDIFFERENTIATED GROUP OF PARTICIPANTS, EACH OF WHIC WAS IN AN IDENTICAL GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION, AND ON WHOM THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE IDENTICAL. THIS WAS SO FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: FIRST, THOSE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHOSE TERRITORY WAS OUTSIDE THE AREA WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED UNDER AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE OR LIMIT THEIR TOTAL FORCE LEVELS. THESE COUNTRIES COULD EVEN INCREASE THEIR TOTAL FORCE LEVELS. A BASIC GEOGRAPHIC FACT OF WHICH ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN IN AN AGREEMENT WAS THAT THE MAJOR EASTERN MILITARY POWER FELL INTO THIS CATEGORY. IT WAS A FACT OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THE USSR WAS LOCATED IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, AND THAT ITS

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VERY LARGE FORCES ENJOYED A WIDE RANGE OF DIRECT MEANS OF ACCESS INTO THE AREA. THE TERRITORY OF THE MAJOR MILITARY POWER ON THE WESTERN SIDE WAS ON THE OTHER HAND LOCATED 5000 KILOMETERS AWAY ACROSS THE ATLANTIC.

14. US REP SAID THAT SECOND, DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHOSE TERRITORY WAS LOCATED WITHIN THE AREA WOULD BE AFFECTED BY OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN AN AGREEMENT IN A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT WAY FROM DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITH THEIR TERRITORY AND THE BULK OF THEIR FORCES OUTSIDE THE AREA. FOR COUNTRIES WITH THEIR TERRITORY IN THE AREA, AGREED OBLIGATIONS FOR REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THEIR FORCES WOULD APPLY TO SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THEIR FORCES. REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WOULD THUS WEIGH FAR MORE HEAVILY ON THESE PARTICIPANTS. THIS POINT TOO HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FRAMING THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE INCLUDED IN AGREEMENTS. THE FACT THAT VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS WERE AFFECTED IN DIFFERENT WAYS BY THEIR GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION MEANT THAN AN AGREEMENT
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MENT WHICH IGNORED GEOGRAPHY AND TREATED ALL PARTICIPANTS IN AN IDENTICAL MANNER WOULD AFFECT THE SECURITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN DIFFERENT WAYS.

15. UK REP STATED THAT YET, IN THEIR JUNE 8 PROPOSALS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD CONTINUED TO TREAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS THOUGH THEY WERE IDENTICAL, DELIBERATELY DISREGARDING THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS. WESTERN REPS WISHED TO GIVE SOME EXAMPLES:

A. MANPOWER REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WERE CONDITIONAL ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF EASTERN DATA. IN PRACTICE, THIS APPROACH WOULD RESULT IN EASTERN REDUCTIONS LEAVING A DESTABILIZING EASTERN MANPOWER SUPERIORITY WITHIN THE AREA, AND COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED FOR THIS REASON. THESE POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS WERE INTENSIFIED BY THE FACT THAT THE LARGE FORCES IN THE NEIGHBORING USSR WOULD NOT BE REDUCED AND COULD EVEN INCREASE IN SIZE.

B. MANPOWER CEILINGS. UNDER THE EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSALS, FAR FROM HAVING A SPECIFIC LIMITATION AT THE RESIDUAL LEVEL ON ITS FORCES IN THE AREA, THE USSR WOULD EVEN HAVE THE ABILITY ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TO INCREASE ITS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER LEVEL WITHIN THE AREA TO THE PRE-REDUCTION LEVEL. AT THE SAME TIME, THE EASTERN JUNE 8

PROPOSALS COULD, AS WESTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT, PREVENT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS FROM MAINTAINING THE AGREED, POST-REDUCTION COLLECTIVE LEVEL WITHIN THE AREA. THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE USSR ADJOINING THE AREA AND THE FACT THAT THE USSR COULD INCREASE AT WILL ITS ALREADY LARGE FORCES ON ITS ADJOINING HOME TERRITORY MAGNIFIED THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF THIS ELEMENT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ON WESTERN PARTICIPANTS.

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CIPANTS.

C. ARMAMENTS. IN THEIR JUNE 8 PROPOSALS, THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY EXPECTED REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF SELECTED ARMAMENTS BY EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT. WESTERN REPS HAD MADE THEIR RESERVATIONS ABOUT THESE PROPOSALS QUITE CLEAR. BUT HERE AGAIN, THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE USSR AGGRAVATED THESE POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES FOR THE WEST. THE LARGE STOCKS OF ARMAMENTS OF FORCES IN THE ADJACENT SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE REDUCED OR LIMITED UNDER AN AGREEMENT AND COULD EVEN INCREASE. MOREOVER, THE ARMAMENTS WITHDRAWN COULD BE ADDED TO THOSE OF ACTIVE DUTY SOVIET FORCES ON ADJACENT SOVIET TERRITORY, WHEREAS REDUCED ARMAMENTS OF COUNTRIES LOCATED IN THE AREA WERE SUPPOSED, ACCORDING TO THE EAST, TO BE PUT OUT OF COMMISSION.

D. FORM OF REDUCTION. THE EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSAL CALLED FOR REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF UNITS. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THIS PROVISION WAS NOT YET CLEAR TO WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. IN ANY EVENT, ANY REDUCTION OR LIMITATION OF UNITS BY STATES WITHIN THE AREA WOULD IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE. BUT NO SUCH OBLIGATION WOULD APPLY TO THE TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE USSR.

16. UK REP SAID THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS URGED THE EAST TO RECOGNIZE THAT DIFFERENCES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF PARTICIPANTS HAD TO BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT IN FRAMING THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY PARTICIPANTS AND TO RE-EXAMINE IN THIS LIGHT THE EASTERN POSITION ON THE ISSUES HE HAD JUST CITED SO THAT AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WHICH REALIZED THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

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17. TARASOV IN LENGTHY IMPROMTU RESPONSE SAID EASTERN REPS HAD LISTENED VERY ATTENTIVELY TO THE STATEMENT WHICH HAD JUST BEEN MADE BY THE UK REP IN WHICH THE WELL-KNOWN WESTERN ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR FOR REACHING AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REPEATED. UK REP HAD ENUMERATED FOUR ASPECTS WHICH ALLEGEDLY PROVED THAT, WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT EQUITABLE FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY, QUITE CLEARLY, AND IN DETAIL, DEMONSTRATED WHY THE SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR SHOULD NOT PLAY ANY ROLE IN ELABORATING AND REACHING AN AGREEMENT. TARASOV SAID HE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOW ALL OF THESE ARGUMENTS BECAUSE THIS WOULD TAKE A LOT OF TIME, BUT HE WOULD TRY TO TOUCH ON THE FOUR ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM WHICH HAD BEEN DEALT WITH IN IN THE STATEMENT OF THE UK REP.

18. TARASOV SAID THE FIRST ASPECT MENTIONED BY THE UK REP CONCERNED THE ISSUE OF FORCE REDUCTIONS. THE UK REP HAD CLAIMED
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THAT THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE EAST'S PROPOSAL OF 8 JUNE, WOULD, ON THE BASIS OF OFFICIAL FIGURES SUBMITTED BY THE SIDES, ALLEGEDLY LEAD TO CONTRACTUALIZING THE DISPARITIES IN THE ARMED FORCE MANPOWER OF THE TWO SIDES IN FAVOR OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. HOWEVER, SUCH STATEMENT DID NOT FOLLOW FROM THE REAL SITUATION WHICH HAD DEVELOPED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT ALSO DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THE OFFICIAL FIGURES SUBMITTED BY THE SIDES IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT DID NOT CORRESPOND EVEN TO THE WESTERN

PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL, WHERE THE NECESSITY OF REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING ON DATA HAD BEEN SPECIFIED. THAT IS, THAT THE POSSIBILITY AND NECESSITY OF ANALYZING AND CLARIFYING THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES OF BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA WAS PROVIDED FOR HERE. THE ALLEGATION ABOUT DISPARITIES WHICH WERE MADE IN THE UK REP'S STATEMENT DID NOT PROVIDE ANY NEW ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD PROVE THE ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF DISPARITIES IN THE ARMED FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA. AND WITHOUT SUCH ARGUMENTS, WITHOUT PROOF FOR THE EXISTENC OF DISPARITIES, THE UK REP'S THESIS THAT THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF ALL STATES WOULD LEAD TO CONTRACTUALIZING THE DISPARITIES WAS COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED AND COULD NOT BE AN ARGUMENT WHICH WOULD PROVE THE NECESSITY OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR.

19. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT THE SECOND ELEMENT WHICH, IN THE OPINION OF THE UK REP, WAS SUBSTANTIATED BY THE SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR, CONCERNED THE ISSUE OF POST-REDUCTION LIMITATIONS ON THE FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA. UK REP HAD STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, WHOSE CAPABILITY TO INCREASE FORCES ON ITS HOME TERRITORY WOULD NOT BE LIMITED, WOULD BE ABLE TO INCREASE ITS FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA AS WELL. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE UK REP HAD EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT, CONTRARY TO OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD
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BE LIMITED IN ITS POSSIBILITY FOR INCREASING ITS FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS ARGUMENT ALSO DID NOT STAND UP TO CRITICISM AND EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THIS FACT. AT PRESENT, TARASOV WISHED TO EMPHASIZE ONLY THE FACT THAT THIS ARGUMENT WAS CONTRARY TO THE WESTERN POSITION ITSELF. AS WAS KNOWN, FROM THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WESTERN REPS HAD CONSISTENTLY BEEN STRIVING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AS THE OUTCOME OF REDUCTIONS. THE ENTIRE WESTERN CONCEPT HAD BEEN DIRECTED TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A CERTAIN MECHANISM PERMITTING EACH OF THE SIDES, THAT IS NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES, TO MAINTAIN THEIR ARMED FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THEIR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AT ONE AND THE SAME AGREED LEVEL. AS FAR AS EASTERN REPS UNDERSTOOD THE MATTER, THE WEST STILL MAINTAINED ITS POSITION. HOWEVER, THE STATEMENT BY THE UK REP IN THE PRESENT SESSION HAD RAISED A QUESTION: WAS THE WEST ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING EQUAL COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, OR HAD THE WEST CHANGED ITS POSITION ON THIS

ISSUE LATELY?

20. TARASOV CONTINUED, WESTERN REPS WERE ASKING EASTERN REPS VARIOUS QUESTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE EAST'S UNDERSTANDING OF HOW SUCH A COLLECTIVE

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CEILING WOULD FUNCTION ACCORDING TO THE EAST'S PROPOSALS.
THE WESTERN QUESTIONS WERE VERY OFTEN OF A HYPOTHETICAL
NATURE. IN THEIR OWN TURN, EASTERN REPS NOW WISHED TO
ASK A SIMILAR QUESTION OF THE UK REP: IF, FOR EXAMPLE,
AFTER REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH AN AGREEMENT, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA SHOULD DECIDE
TO UNILATERALLY REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY 20,000 MEN EACH, WHO
IN THIS CASE WOULD BE ABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THESE
REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE EAST'S COLLECTIVE
LEVEL AT THE FIGURE WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED UPON FOR THE
REDUCTIONS? ONE COULD HARDLY SUPPOSE THAT THE GDR
WOULD BE ABLE IN THIS CASE TO INCREASE ITS FORCES BY
40,000 MEN. BUT, IF ONE SUPPOSED THAT THE GDR WOULD BE
UNABLE TO INCREASE ITS FORCES BY 40,000 MEN, THEN THE
COLLECTIVE LEVEL OF THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES
WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY LOWER THAN THE WESTERN COLLECTIVE
LEVEL. WHAT WAY OUT OF THAT SITUATION WOULD THE UK REP PROPOSE
IN THE EVENT THAT SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA WOULD BE LIMITED

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BY A NATIONAL CEILING? TARASOV SAID HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE UK REP WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE A SATISFACTORY ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. THIS IS WHY HE WOULD LIKE TO STATE IMMEDIATELY THAT THIS ARGUMENT WAS UNFOUNDED IN SUBSTANTIATING THE CONCEPTION OF THE SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR.

21. TARASOV SAID THE THIRD ELEMENT TOUCHED ON IN THE UK REP'S STATEMENT PERTAINED TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. THE UK REP HAD ONCE MORE STATED THAT SOVIET FORCES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE LIMITED AS FAR AS THEIR ARMAMENTS WERE CONCERNED, WHILE THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LOCATED IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA WOULD BE LIMITED IN THEIR ARMAMENTS AFTER THEIR ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT. FROM THIS FACT, THE CONCLUSION WAS DRAWN THAT, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD REDUCE ITS ARMAMENTS IN THE REDUCTION AREA, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE THE SAME OBLIGATIONS. BUT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEE WHAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE LIKE IN REALITY. THE SOVIET UNION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH BOTH THE EASTERN AND WESTERN REDUCTION CONCEPTS, WOULD WITHDRAW A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF ITS ARMAMENTS FROM THE REDUCTION AREA, THUS, PHYSICALLY, THERE WOULD BE FEWER SOVIET ARMAMENTS IN THE REDUCTION AREA. MOREOVER, A CERTAIN TYPE OF SOVIET ARMAMENTS, TANKS TO BE PRECISE, WOULD BE LIMITED AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AT THE SAME TIME TO THE ARMAMENTS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD THEY DECIDE TO REDUCE THEM? FROM THE EAST'S POINT OF VIEW, THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS WAS QUITE OBVIOUS. THESE ARMAMENTS, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD BE TAKEN FROM THE COMBAT COMPOSITION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES, WOULD NEVERTHELESS REMAIN IN THE AREA. THEREFORE, EVEN IN THE CASE THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS, THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD NEVERTHELESS OBTAIN
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SUBSTANTIAL AND RATHER SERIOUS ADVANTAGES. UNLIKE THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS PREFERRED TO DWELL UPON CONFLICT SITUATIONS. IT WAS OBVIOUSLY CLEAR THAT, IN THE EVENT OF SUCH A SITUATION, SHOULD IT ARISE, SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE COMPELLED TO TRANSFER THEIR COMBAT EQUIPMENT INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WHEREAS THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO DO SO SINCE THEIR COMBAT EQUIPMENT TAKEN OUT OF THE COMBAT COMPOSITION OF THEIR FORCES WOULD BE STORED IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND COULD THEREFORE BE USED IMMEDIATELY. THUS IN THIS ISSUE TOO, THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR DID NOT PERTAIN IN ANY WAY TO THE SUBJECTS UNDER DISCUSSION IN THE VIENNA TALKS.

22. TARASOV SAID FINALLY, THE FOURTH ELEMENT CONTAINED IN THE UK REP'S STATEMENT PERTAINED TO THE

FORM OF FORCE REDUCTIONS. THE UK REP HAD STATED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDING FOR THE REDUCTION OF FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST SINCE THEY WOULD AFFECT THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ITS FORCES IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, WHEN THE WEST RAISED ITS REQUIREMENT REGARDING THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA, IT HAD DEMANDED NOT MERELY THE REDUCTION OF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA, BUT HAD PROPOSED TO REDUCE THEM BY MAJOR UNITS, AND BY QUITE SPECIFIC MAJOR UNITS. THIS MEANT THAT, FOR THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT MERELY TO HAVE THE NUMERICAL REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES,

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BUT RATHER THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE TRYING TO OBTAIN THE LIMITATION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF FORMATIONS. THUS, THE WESTERN DEMANDS WERE DIRECTED ALSO TO THE LIMITATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF SOVIET FORCES. IT WAS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF FORCE REDUCTIONS BY FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUBUNITS SHOULD NOT EVEN BE COMPARED WITH THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF FORCE REDUCTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL SERVICE MEN. IF THE WEST BELIEVED THAT A REQUIREMENT OF THIS KIND FOR THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES WAS JUSTIFIED, THEN IT WAS COMPLETELY UNCLEAR WHY THE WEST DID NOT APPLY THE SAME REQUIREMENT TO THE

REDUCTION OF ITS OWN FORCES. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FORM OF FORCE REDUCTIONS WAS IN NO CASE RELATED TO THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR. THE QUESTION WAS NOW NOT ABOUT THE FACT OF HOW MANY DIVISIONS OR BRIGADES WOULD BE IN THE FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION, US, UK, CANADA OR OTHER COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE REDUCTION AREA. INSTEAD, PARTICIPANTS WERE SPEAKING ABOUT HOW MANY UNITS AND OF WHICH TYPE WOULD BE SECRET

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LOCATED IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

23. TARASOV SAID THUS, THE ARGUMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN CITED BY THE UK REP WHICH WERE DESIGNED IN HIS OPINION TO PROVE THE NECESSITY OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR, HAD NOT IN FACT SUBSTANTIATED ANYTHING. THEY HAD ONLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE WEST, CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY IN NEGOTIATIONS, WANTED TO USE THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. SUCH AN APPROACH NATURALLY COULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS WHY EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT ANY REFERENCES TO THE SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR WERE UNCONVINCING FOR EASTERN REPS. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SPEEDING UP THE PROCESS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, WESTERN REPS SHOULD NOT TURN BACK TO THESE FACTORS.

24. UK REP THANKED THE SOVIET REP FOR HIS RATHER LONG AND ARGUMENTATIVE STATEMENT. UK REP DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SOVIET REP HAD REALLY DEALT IN HIS STATEMENT WITH THE MAIN THEME OF UK REP'S PRESENTATION, WHICH HAD BEEN THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR TO THE EASTERN PROPOSALS AND TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AS SUCH. IN HIS PRESENTATION, UK REP HAD STRESSED THAT THE SIZE OF SOVIET FORCES ON SOVIET TERRITORY ADJACENT TO THE REDUCTIONS AREA HAD AN IMPORTANT EFFECT ON THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. AS TO THE POINTS WHICH THE SOVIET REP HAD RAISED, WESTERN REPS WOULD RETURN TO THEM IN DUE COURSE. UK REP WISHED TO STRESS THAT IN TARASOV'S HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION TO UK REP ABOUT POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK REDUCTIONS, TARASOV HAD NEATLY AVOIDED REPLYING TO THE POINT WHICH HAD BEEN MADE BY THE FRG REP IN THE LAST SESSION, WHEN FRG REP HAD SECRET

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SHOWN HOW THE MECHANISM WHICH THE EAST HAD SUGGESTED ON ITS PROPOSALS WOULD NOT WORK. WESTERN REPS WERE STILL

AWAITING EASTERN COMMENTS ON THIS ISSUE. REGARDING THE POINTS RAISED BY TARASOV IN HIS PRESENT REMARKS, WESTERN REPS WOULD DEAL WITH THEM SUBSEQUENTLY.

25. US DEPREP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK A FACTUAL QUESTION IN CONNECTION WITH TARASOV'S REMARKS: PREVIOUSLY, EASTERN REPS HAD INFORMALLY SPOKEN OF DESTRUCTION OF THOSE ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED BY PARTICIPANTS WHOSE TERRITORY WAS LOCATED IN THE REDUCTION AREA. NOW, TARASOV WAS STATING THAT THESE ARMAMENTS WOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF ACTIVE UNITS AND STORED IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

26. US DEPREP'S QUESTION WAS, WAS THIS UNDERSTANDING CORRECT, AND WOULD THERE BE LIMITATIONS ON THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF THE ARMAMENTS OF THE TYPE REDUCED BY THESE PARTICIPANTS HAVING TERRITORY IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA?

27. TARASOV SAID IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THOSE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTIONS WOULD BE LIMITED AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS. BUT TARASOV WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT, UNLIKE THE SOVIET ARMAMENTS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE REDUCTION AREA, THE ARMAMENTS FROM THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO REDUCTIONS WOULD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE EAST'S DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973, HAVE TO BE TAKEN OUT OF THE COMBAT COMPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. NETHERLANDS REP ASKED HOW LIMITATIONS WOULD APPLY TO THE REDUCED ARMAMENTS. TARASOV SAID, IN ACTIVE

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DUTY FORCES -- US DEPREP ASKED TARASOV WHETHER THE PHRASE
QUOTE THE COMBAT COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES UNQUOTE COULD BE UNDER-
STOOD IN THE SAME WAY AS ACTIVE DUTY FORCES. AFTER TAKING ADVICE
FROM KAPITONOV, TARASOV SAID IT COULD BE SO UNDERSTOOD.

28. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, IN THE ACTIVE DUTY FORCES
OR COMBAT COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES, THE NUMBER OF
ARMAMENTS SUBJECT TO REDUCTION COULD NOT BE INCREASED.
NETHERLANDS REP ASKED WHETHER THE ARMAMENTS TO BE STORED
UNDER THE EASTERN PROGRAM WOULD BE LIMITED IN THE SAME WAY.
TARASOV SAID, IF PARTICIPANTS WERE REDUCING ANY TYPE OF
ARMAMENTS THIS MEANT THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING TO INCREASE
THE NUMBER OF SUCH ARMAMENTS. IN THE CASE OF WESTERN
EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS, THIS MEANT THAT THE NUMBER OF
ARMAMENTS WOULD BE LIMITED BY THE RESIDUAL LEVELS IN THE
FORCES AND BY THE QUANTITY STORED BY THIS TIME IN STORAGE
FACILITIES.

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29. TARASOV SAID HE WISHED TO ADD AS REGARDS THE
NETHERLANDS REP QUESTION THAT, NOW, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
EASTERN PROPOSALS OF 8 JUNE, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US
WOULD UNDERTAKE THEIR ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN A PACKAGE
DEAL. THAT IS, THEY WOULD REDUCE NOT ALL, BUT RATHER,
CERTAIN SPECIFIED TYPES OF ARMAMENTS. THIS MEANT THAT
OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO
REDUCE NOT ALL THE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS, BUT RATHER SOME
SPECIFIED TYPES. ACCORDINGLY, LIMITATIONS WOULD COVER ONLY
THOSE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION.
THIS WOULD NOT PREVENT INCREASE OF OTHER ARMAMENTS.

30. NETHERLANDS REP DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED
BY THE AD HOC GROUP SAID HIS FIRST QUESTION WAS: AS WESTERN
REPS UNDERSTOOD IT, THE NUMBER OF MEN IN SEPARATE TANKS UNITS
AND SUBUNITS CONTAINING A NUMBER OF TANKS EQUAL TO THE NUMBER
IN A TANK DIVISION WOULD HAVE A COLLECTIVE MANPOWER STRENGTH
FAR LESS THAN THAT OF A TANK DIVISION. THIS WAS OBVIOUS FROM
THE FACT THAT, WITHIN A TANK DIVISION THERE WERE NOT ONLY
THE REGIMENTS AND BATTALIONS CONTAINING TANKS, BUT
ALSO A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF OTHER TYPES OF UNITS CONTAINING
NO TANKS BUT HAVING MUCH OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE DIVISION.
FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WERE, IN A TANK DIVISION, UNITS OF
MOTORIZED INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE ROCKET AND AIR
DEFENSE ARTILLERY, SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, TRANSPORTATION

MAINTENANCE, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS.

31. TARASOV REPLIED THAT, AS FAR AS THE NUMBER OF
TANKS WAS CONCERNED, THE TANK UNITS AND SUBUNITS WHICH THE

SOVIET UNION PROPOSED TO REDUCE WOULD BE EQUAL TO THE NUMBER
OF TANKS IN A TANK DIVISION. AS FAR AS PERSONNEL WERE
CONCERNED, THE PERSONNEL OF THOSE TANK UNITS AND SUBUNITS,
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TOGETHER WITH THE PERSONNEL OF THE SOVIET ARMY CORPS
HEADQUARTERS WITH ITS SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS,
WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO THE PERSONNEL OF ONE TANK
DIVISION.

32. NETHERLANDS REP SAID HIS SECOND QUESTION WAS:
THE EAST HAD OFFERED TO WITHDRAW 250 MECHANIZED INFANTRY
COMBAT VEHICLES. WOULD THESE VEHICLES BE
THOSE MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES KNOWN AS BMP
(BOYEVAYA MASHINA PEKHOTY), OR WOULD THEY BE VEHICLES OF
ANOTHER TYPE?

33. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH KAPITONOV, TARASOV STATED
THE EAST PROPOSED TO REDUCE 250 BMPS.

34. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THE WEST'S THIRD QUESTION WAS:
THE EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSAL PROVIDED THAT THE POST-
REDUCTION NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF EACH STATE
COULD NOT BE RAISED THROUGH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF
MILITARY POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY CIVILIANS IN PEACETIME.
EASTERN REPS HAD IDENTIFIED THOSE POSITIONS IN THE
FRG ARMED FORCES WHICH WERE SPECIFIED AS POSITIONS WHICH
COULD BE FILLED IN PEACETIME EITHER BY CIVILIANS OR BY
MILITARY PERSONNEL AS THE TYPE OF POSITION THEY HAD IN MIND.
WAS THIS THE ONLY TYPE OF POSITION THE EAST HAD IN MIND?
DID EASTERN REPS HAVE IN MIND A NUMERICAL LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER
OF SUCH POSITIONS ON EACH SIDE? WOULD INFORMATION ON
THE LOCATION AND NUMBER OF THESE POSITIONS BE EXCHANGED?

35. TARASOV SAID THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WAS YES.
THE EAST HAD IN MIND PRECISELY THAT TYPE OF MILITARY
POSITION WHICH COULD BE FILLED IN PEACETIME EITHER BY
MILITARY PERSONNEL OR CIVILIANS. AS REGARDS THE SECOND

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PART OF NETHERLANDS REP'S QUESTION THE ANSWER WAS YES,
THE EASTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDED THAT THE NUMBER OF
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FILLING MILITARY POSITIONS COULD NOT
BE INCREASED. NATURALLY, IF SUCH POSITIONS WERE TAKEN
BY MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE NUMBER OF THE LATTER COULD BE INCREASED.
THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ON THIS ISSUE
WAS TO PREVENT COVERT INCREASES OF FORCES THROUGH THE
USE OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN PURELY MILITARY POSITIONS.
AS REGARDS THE THIRD PART OF THE NETHERLANDS REP'S
QUESTION, THIS PERTAINED TO THE GENERAL UNDERSTANDING
ON THE VERIFICATION OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS. THEREFORE, AT
PRESENT, TARASOV COULD NOT GIVE WESTERN REPS ANY SPECIFIC
ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

36. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THE WEST'S FOURTH QUESTION WAS:
UNDER THE JUNE 8 EASTERN PROPOSALS, WOULD THE ONLY
REDUCTIONS OR LIMITATIONS OF US AND SOVIET ARMAMENTS WHICH
THE EAST ENVISAGED AT PRESENT BE THOSE SPECIFIED FOR THE
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FIRST PHASE?

37. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS PROPOSED THAT THE
FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD PROVIDE FOR REDUCTIONS AND
LIMITATIONS OF SOVIET AND US ARMAMENTS ONLY OF THOSE TYPES
AND IN SUCH QUANTITIES AS WOULD BE AGREED UPON. IN THIS
EVENT, EASTERN REPS DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF

FURTHER REDUCTINS OF SOVIET AND US ARMAMENTS. HOWEVER,
THE ISSUE OF THE TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF SUCH REDUCTIONS
COULD BECOME THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS.

38. US DEPREP ASKED, DID THIS MEAN THAT THE ONLY US AND SOVIET
ARMAMENTS WHOSE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED UNDER THE
EASTERN PROPOSALS WOULD BE THOSE SPECIFIED IN THE
EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR PHASE I? TARASOV SAID THE EASTERN
PROPOSALS PROVIDED FOR REDUCTIONS OF DEFINITE AND SPECIFIC
TYPES OF ARMAMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US IN THE
FIRST STAGE. AS ALREADY STATED THIS DID NOT EXCLUDE
THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS BUT THIS COULD
BECOME THE SUBJECT OF STAGE 2 NEGOTIATIONS.

39. NETHERLANDS REP ASKED WHETHER THE EAST EXPECTED
THE USSR AND THE USA TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN A PHASE I
AGREEMENT TO REDUCE FURTHER ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II. TARASOV
SAID NO, THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. THE EASTERN PROPOSALS DID
NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS OF THE SOVIET
UNION AND THE US AS REGARDS ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN THE
SECOND PHASE WHICH WOULD ALREADY BE FIXED IN THE FIRST
PHASE AGREEMENT.

40. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THE WEST'S FIFTH QUESTION WAS:
UNDER THE JUNE 8 EASTERN PROPOSALS, WOULD THE ONLY REDUCTION
OF US BRIGADES AND SOVIET DIVISIONS WHICH THE EAST ENVISAGED
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AT PRESENT BE THOSE SPECIFIED FOR THE FIRST PHASE? WHAT
FORM WOULD US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE TAKE?

41. TARASOV SAID THE EASTERN PROPOSALS SPECIFIED THE
FORMATIONS AND UNITS BY WHICH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED
STATES WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST STAGE. THE
EASTERN PROPOSALS DID NOT CONTAIN ANY SPECIFICATION AS
TO THE TYPE OF UNITS AND SUBUNITS BY WHICH SOVIET AND
AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE SECOND STAGE,
ALTHOUGH, FROM THE EAST'S GENERAL APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE
PROVIDING FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS, IT FOLLOWED THAT THE
EAST WOULD BEAR IN MIND THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND US FORCES
IN THE SECOND STAGE BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS. THE
SPECIFIC NATURE OF SUCH UNITS AND SUB-UNITS COULD BECOME
THE SUBJECT MATTER FOR SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS.

42. NETHERLANDS REP STATED THAT HE WOULD NOW LIKE TO
ANSWER SOME QUESTIONS WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD AKSED REGARDING
WESTERN DATA. IN THE JUNE 20 INFORMAL SESSION, EASTERN
REPS HAD ASKED WHETHER A NUMBER OF FUNCTIONS IN THE US GROUND
FORCES IN EUROPE WHICH FORMERLY HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY US

MILITARY PERSONNEL HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN THE PERIOD FROM 1973 TO JANUARY 1976. THE ANSWER WAS THAT, AS THE WEST HAD STATED ALREADY, THE REORGANIZATION OF US GROUND FORCES TO MEET NUNN AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS HAD ENTAILED ELIMINATING SOME SUPPORT UNITS AND REPLACING THOSE WITH COMBAT UNITS. THIS HAD RESULTED IN A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PERFORM CERTAIN SUPPORT FUNCTIONS. THE REORGANIZATION HAD NOT INCREASED THE NUMBER OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE REORGANIZATION HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY VARIOUS METHODS. IN ADDITION TO REDUCTION OF SUPPORT FUNCTIONS, TRANSFER AND CONSOLIDATION OF FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, AND RELOCATION OF SOME SUPPORT UNITS TO THE UNITED STATES, IT HAD

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INCLUDED REPLACEMENT OF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WITH CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN SUCH ACTIVITIES AS POSTAL SERVICES, TRANSPORTATION, EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE AND MEDICAL ACTIVITIES.

43. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT TURN TO THE EASTERN QUESTIONS ON WESTERN DATA WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED IN THE JUNE 27 INFORMAL SESSION. IN THEIR FIRST QUESTION OF JUNE 27, EASTERN REPS HAD REFERRED TO PERSONNEL OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE UNITS WHOM THE WEST COUNTED IN THE CATEGORY OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN MAJOR FORMATIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED TO WHICH COUNTRIES DID THESE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE UNITS BELONG? THE ANSWER WAS THAT THE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE UNITS TO WHICH THE EASTERN QUESTION HAD REFERRED WERE THE PERSHING MISSILE UNITS IN THE AIR FORCE OF THE FRG.

44. NETHERLAND'S REP SAID THAT THE EAST'S SECOND QUESTION HAD BEEN WHETHER ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNITS
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WHICH FORMED A PART OF THE WESTERN AIR FORCES HAD BEEN COUNTED BY THE WEST IN THE GROUND FORCES AND INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCE FIGURES. THE ANSWER WAS THAT AS OF JANUARY 1, 1976, THERE WERE NO ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNITS IN THE AIR FORCES OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THEREFORE, ALL ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY PERSONNEL OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN COUNTED IN THE WEST'S FIGURES FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, AND HAD BEEN ALLOCATED TO THE TWO CATEGORIES AS DESCRIBED BY THE BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON APRIL 14.

45. NETHERLANDS' REP STATED THAT IN THEIR THIRD QUESTION, EASTERN REPS HAD REFERRED TO THE JUNE 13 WESTERN STATEMENT THAT SOME SMALL ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNITS OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT SUB-ORDINATED TO CORPS, AND THEIR PERSONNEL HAD THEREFORE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE CATEGORY OF MAJOR FORMATIONS. THE ANSWER TO THE EAST'S QUESTION ON THIS SUBJECT WAS THAT THE UNITS REFERRED TO WERE UNITS OF BATTALION AND BATTERY SIZE. THESE UNITS HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE SECOND CATEGORY BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT SUBORDINATE TO CORPS BUT RATHER TO OTHER HEADQUARTERS IN THE AREA.

46. NETHERLANDS' REP SAID THAT IN THEIR FOURTH QUESTION, EASTERN REPS HAD REFERRED TO A JUNE 7, 1977 WESTERN STATEMENT CONCERNING THE USE OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR THE GUARDING OF PUBLIC PREMISES. IN THIS CONNECTION, EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED THE WESTERN REPS TO SPECIFY WITHIN WHICH OF THE TWO CATEGORIES SUCH PERSONNEL HAD BEEN INCLUDED. THE ANSWER WAS THAT THE SMALL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IN WESTERN ARMED FORCES WHO GUARDED PUBLIC PREMISES, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM PERSONNEL WHO GUARDED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, BELONGED TO SPECIAL UNITS NOT BELONGING TO CORPS. THESE PERSONNEL
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HAD THEREFORE BEEN COUNTED IN THE SECOND CATEGORY.

47. NETHERLANDS' REP STATED THAT IN THEIR FIFTH QUESTION, EASTERN REPS HAD REFERRED TO A MARCH 15, 1977 WESTERN STATEMENT REGARDING THE COUNTING OF US MILITARY UNITS LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE BUT ASSIGNED TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF COMMANDS AND SERVICES SITUATED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE US. EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED WESTERN REPS TO SPECIFY IN WHICH BRANCH OF THE SERVICE AND IN WHICH OF THE TWO DATA CATEGORIES FIGURES FOR THOSE PERSONNEL HAD BEEN INCLUDED. WESTERN REPS HAD ALREADY IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 6, PROVIDED THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION AS REGARDS US AIR FORCE PERSONNEL LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS OF COMMANDS AND SERVICES SITUATED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE US. AS REGARDS GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL, THERE WERE IN THE AREA A NUMBER OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMUNICATION, TRAINING, AND OTHER SUPPORT ELEMENTS WHOSE HEADQUARTERS WERE LOCATED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE US. SUCH PERSONNEL HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE SECOND CATEGORY.

48. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID, IN THE PRESENT SESSION, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WISHED TO EXPLAIN THE EASTERN POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS IN LIGHT OF THEIR NEW PROPOSALS SUBMITTED ON JUNE 8. AS WAS KNOWN, IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT TABLED BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS ON NOVEMBER 8, 1973, THERE WERE ENVISAGED REDUCTIONS OF ALL KINDS OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE BASIS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD PROPOSED THAT SUCH A REDUCTION SHOULD IN PRACTICE BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH THE WITHDRAWAL OR DISBANDMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY

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UNITS, FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUB-UNITS, TOGETHER WITH
THEIR ARMAMENTS.

49. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT, IN FEBRUARY 1976, IN THE INTEREST OF ACHIEVING AN UNDERSTANDING, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO THE REDUCTION OF EQUAL NUMBERS OF SPECIFIED TYPES OF ARMAMENTS OF THE US AND USSR AND WITH THE UNDERTAKING OF ONLY GENERAL COMMITMENTS REGARDING THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE SECOND STAGE. THIS TIME, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD MADE A YET MORE SIGNIFICANT AND FARGOING MOVE. THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO AGREE WITH THE SELECTIVE REDUCTION OF THE ARMAMENTS OF THE USA AND THE USSR IN A FIRST STAGE OF THOSE TYPES SPECIFIED BY THE WESTERN STATES. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS CONTINUED TO GIVE PREFERENCE TO THEIR INITIAL POSITION, BUT THE FOUR AND ONE HALF YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS HAD SHOWED THAT THE NATO COUNTRIES WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT
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A RADICAL SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS. IN ALL THEIR PROPOSALS, BEGINNING WITH THE SCHEME THEY HAD SUBMITTED IN NOVEMBER 1973, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN SUGGESTING THAT THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMAMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN PHASE I SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH THE WITHDRAWAL OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

50. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT, IN ORDER TO MEET WESTERN WISHES OF THIS TYPE, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN A FIRST STAGE IN THE FORM OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,000 SOVIET TANKS OF THIS TYPE. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WISHED TO EXPLAIN THAT, WITH REGARD TO ITS MILITARY WEIGHT, THIS WAS A VERY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION. ITS REALIZATION WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO SECURING MILITARY DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS MOVE TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE SUBSEQUENT LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET TANKS, HAD SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE WELL KNOWN NATO PROGRAM OF INCREASES IN THE NUMBER AND MDERNIZATION OF TANKS IN THE ARMIES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. IT WAS AT THE SAME TIME NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD EXPRESSED ITS READINESS ALSO TO WITHDRAW 250 MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES WITHOUT ASKING THE US SIDE TO CARRY

OUT REDUCTION OF THE SAME TYPE OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT.
THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT ADDITION TO THE ARSENAL OF
COMBAT EQUIPMENT TO BE REDUCED BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS
AND A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF GOOD WILL ON THEIR PART.

51. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED, IN ITS PROPOSAL OF
DECEMBER 16, 1975, THE WEST HAD SPECIFIED 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS,
36 PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS, AND 54 F-4 NUCLEAR
CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AS THE CONCRETE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS WHICH
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WOULD BE WITHDRAWN BY THE US IN PHASE I. THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS
HAD AGREED THAT THE US SHOULD REDUCE THESE PARTICULAR ARMAMENTS
IN THE FIRST STAGE IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES HAD AT TIMES GIVEN A REALISTIC EVALUATION OF THE
MILITARY WEIGHT OF SUCH REDUCTIONS AND THAT EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES CONSIDERED THAT THESE EVALUATIONS
CONTINUED TO BE CORRECT UP TO THE PRESENT.

52. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN
PARTICIPANTS HAD ALSO ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN
COUNTRIES THAT THE LIMITATIONS ON THE ARMAMENTS OF SOVIET UNION
AND US TO REMAIN IN CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER REDUCTIONS
SHOULD APPLY ONLY TO THE AMOUNT OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS,
PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS, AND F 4 NUCLEAR
CAPABLE AIRCRAFT OF THE USA AS WELL AS TO THE
AMOUNT OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

53. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT IT FOLLOWED FROM
WHAT HE HAD ALREADY SAID THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS
HAD EXERTED EFFORTS TOWARD ACHIEVING A MUTUAL UNDER-
STANDING ON A LARGE NUMBER OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO
THE POSSIBLE SOLUTION OF WHICH WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES,
AS THEY HAD REPEATEDLY CLAIMED ATTACHED PARAMOUNT
IMPORTANCE. WHILE NOTHING THE MEETING OF POSITIONS OF
THE EASTERN AND WESTERN COUNTRIES AS REGARDS THE REDUCTION
OF ARMAMENTS IN SOME ASPECTS, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES
WISHED TO STATE AT THE SAME TIME THAT THERE STILL
REMAINED MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF
THE TWO SIDES ON THIS TOPIC.

54. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT THE MAIN AREA
DIFFERENCE CONSISTED IN THE DIFFERING APPROACHES OF

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THE WESTERN AND EASTERN COUNTRIES TO THE PARTICIPATION
OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA IN THE
REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, AS
IT ALSO FOLLOWED FROM THEIR PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8, 1978,
WERE OF THE OPINION THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANT
STATES SHOULD TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.
THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS THEMSELVES WERE ALL WITHOUT
EXCEPTION PREPARED TO TAKE EFFECTIVE PART IN SUCH A
REDUCTION. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS REGARDED REDUCTION OF
ARMAMENTS AS INDISPENSABLE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
FIRST, MILITARY DETENTE COULD BE GENUINELY EFFECTIVE
ONLY IN THE EVENT THAT THE REDUCTION PROCESS WOULD
EMBRACE NOT ONLY ARMED FORCE MANPOWER, BUT ALSO ARMAMENTS.
SECOND, PARTICIPANTS WERE COMMITTED TO SUCH A REDUCTION
BY THE VERY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AGREED
BY ALL PARTICIPANTS FIVE YEARS AGO. FINALLY, EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES BELIEVE THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY
REQUIRED THAT NOT ONLY TWO STATES, THE USSR AND USA,
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BUT ALSO OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TAKE PART
IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS SINCE UNDER AN AGREEMENT ALL
OF THEM WOULD HAVE THE SAME OBLIGATIONS AND ENJOY THE
SAME RIGHTS.

55. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES COULD NOT
AGREE WITH THE WEST'S POSITION THAT ARMAMENTS SHOULD ONLY

BE REDUCED BY USSR AND USA WHILE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE FREE OF SUCH REDUCTION. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT AGREE WITH THIS IF ONLY FOR THE REASON THAT, IN SUCH A CASE, THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE WARSAW TREATY STATES WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED. IT WAS AFTER ALL QUITE EVIDENT THAT THE EXCLUSION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES, THE ARMED FORCES OF WHICH FORMED THE BULK OF THE NATO MILITARY GROUPING, FROM THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMAMENTS COULD AMOUNT TO THE OBTAINING BY THE WEST OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE INTERESTS OF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS.

56. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT, PROCEEDING FROM THIS POINT, EASTERN REPS HAD PROPOSED THAT ALL STATES OTHER THAN THE USSR AND USA SHOULD ALSO SPECIFY IN THE STAGE 1 AGREEMENT THAT, IN ADDITION TO THEIR ARMED FORCE MANPOWER, THEY WOULD ALSO REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN A SECOND STAGE. CONCRETE COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE REGARDING THE COMPOSITION AND THE SCOPE OF ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED, WOULD BE DETERMINED IN THE COURSE OF SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS AS HAD ALREADY BEEN STATED EARLIER IN THE SESSION. IF IT WERE POSSIBLE, AT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS SHOWED, TO OUTLINE THE ROAD TOWARD AGREEMENT ON THE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED BY THE USSR AND THE USA, THEN IT WAS COMPLETELY EVIDENT THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO COME TO THE SAME SUCCESSFUL UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT TYPES OF ARMAMENTS WOULD BE REDUCED BY THE OTHER

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DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES IF THERE WAS GOOD WILL.

57. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED, THAT, AS WAS KNOWN, AT THE INFORMAL SESSION OF APRIL 14, 1978, THE US REP HAD REPLIED TO THE FOLLOWING EASTERN QUESTION QUOTE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO ASSUME THAT AMONG THE "OTHER QUESTIONS" WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WOULD BE IN PARTICULAR THE QUESTIONS REGARDING THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS UNQUOTE. US REP HAD SAID QUOTE THEY WILL NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SUBJECT OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND COULD BE DISCUSSED IF ONE OF THE SIDES WOULD WISH TO DO SO UNQUOTE. WITH REGARD TO THIS STATEMENT, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO ASK WESTERN REPS TO EXPLAIN TO EASTERN REPS DID THIS ANSWER MEAN THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA CONSIDERED IT POSSIBLE TO REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS? OR SHOULD THIS ANSWER IMPLY THAT ALSO IN A SECOND PHASE, THE WEST WOULD CONSIDER THIS QUESTION FROM THE POSITION IT HAD BEEN ASSUMING UP TO THE PRESENT, WHICH MEANT THAT IT WOULD REFUSE REDUCTION OF ANY TYPE OF ARMAMENT WHATEVER BY THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN THE USA?

58. GDR REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO REPLY TO QUESTIONS
PUT TO THE EAST ON JUNE 27. QUESTIONS 1 AND 2 WERE ABOUT
WHETHER THERE WERE ANY MILITARY POSITIONS IN THE SOVIET FORCES IN
THE REDUCTION AREA FILLED BY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. THE
EAST'S REPLY WAS THAT EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY REPLIED TO A
QUESTION OF THIS KIND ON 21 JUNE 1977 AND ON 5 JULY
1977. IN THESE REPLIES, EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT,
IN THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES, THERE WERE NO
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FILLING MILITARY POSITIONS. THIS
REFERRED AS WELL TO OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER
POSTS.

59. GDR REP SAID, IN QUESTIONS 3 AND 4, WESTERN REPS HAD
ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE SOVIET
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FORCES NOT BEING PAID OUT OF THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY
OF DEFENSE AND WHETHER THESE PERSONNEL HAD BEEN INCLUDED
IN EASTERN DATA. THE EAST'S REPLY WAS THAT, ON 21 JUNE
1977 EASTERN REPS HAD TOLD WESTERN REPS THAT IN THE
REDUCTION AREA, THERE WERE NO SOVIET UNITS WHICH, REGARDLESS
OF THEIR BELONGING TO ANY OTHER AUTHORITY, WERE NOT SUBORDI-
NATED TO SOVIET COMMAND IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE

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PERSONNEL OF ALL SOVIET UNITS IN THE REDUCTION AREA HAD THEREFORE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE EASTERN FIGURES. THIS STATEMENT FURNISHED A CLEAR REPLY TO THE ABOVE-MENTIONED QUESTION.

60. GDR REP SAID THE WEST'S QUESTION 5 HAD REFERRED TO PERSONNEL UNDERGOING TRAINING IN THE UNITS OF THE SOVIET GROUP OF FORCES IN THE GDR. THE REPLY TO THIS QUESTION WAS THAT THE PERSONNEL UNDERGOING TRAINING IN THE TRAINING UNITS OF THE GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE GDR FOR THE DURATION OF TRAINING PERIOD HAD BEEN INCLUDED BY THE EAST IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR RESPECTIVE TRAINING UNITS.

61. GDR REP SAID EASTERN REPS NOW WISHED TO REPLY TO A QUESTION PUT TO THEM IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 13. IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, THE US REP HAD ASKED WHETHER THE RULE OF A 50 PERCENT COMPENSATION FOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS ALSO COVERED THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF AIR FORCES OR WHETHER THIS
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RULE APPLIED ONLY TO GROUND FORCES. GDR REP SAID THAT, BEFORE REPLYING TO THIS QUESTION, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO MAKE A FEW GENERAL REMARKS IN THIS CONNECTION. WESTERN REPS, AS WAS KNOWN, HAD FROM THE OUTSET OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS BEEN COMING OUT AGAINST ANY REDUCTION, EVEN AN INSIGNIFICANT ONE, OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR AIR FORCES. IN CONTRAST TO THIS, THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD FROM THE BEGINNING BEEN INSISTING ON THE REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES AS WELL AS GROUND FORCES. IN THIS, THEY HAD PROCEEDED FROM THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT THE ROLE OF AIR FORCES HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLY INCREASED IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT IN ADDITION TO THIS, THE IMPORTANCE OF AIR FORCES WOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO BE ON THE RISE. THIS WAS WHY EASTERN REPS HAD STATED IN ALL DETERMINATION THAT, WITHOUT THE REDUCTION OR AT LEAST LIMITATION OF AIR FORCES, THERE COULD BE NO TALK OF AN EFFECTIVE REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ALTHOUGH EASTERN ARGUMENTS ON THIS POINT WERE DEFINITELY WELL FOUNDED, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONTINUED TO PURSUE THE LINE OF EXCLUDING THIS ARMED SERVICE FROM REDUCTIONS. IN VIEW OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD DECIDED TO MEET THE WISHES OF THE WEST AND HAD AGREED TO REDUCE GROUND FORCES ONLY, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE INCREASED NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF AIR FORCES EVEN IF NOT REDUCED, WOULD, HOWEVER, BE LIMITED TO A COMMON CEILING OF 200,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE. THIS MEANT THAT THE AIR FORCES ON EACH SIDE WOULD EITHER

HAVE TO BE LIMITED AT THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH THEY HAD AT THE TIME WHEN AN AGREEMENT WAS BEING CONCLUDED OR THAT ON EACH SIDE THEY COULD BE BROUGHT TO A COMMON CEILING OF 200,000 MEN. FOR THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, EITHER VERSION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

62. GDR REP CONTINUED, WHEN THE WARSAW TREATY STATES HAD SUBMITTED THEIR NEW PROPOSAL AND HAD TAKEN INTO
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CONSIDERATION THE WELL KNOWN WESTERN POSITION EXCLUDING THE REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES, THEY PROCEEDED FROM THE FACT THAT THEIR AIR FORCES WERE NOT GOING TO BE REDUCED. IN THE CASE OF A UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF AIR FORCES BY SOME STATES, WHICH THEORETICALLY OF COURSE COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED, NO SINGLE OTHER STATE BELONGING TO THE SAME GROUPING WOULD BE ALLOWED HOWEVER TO INCREASE ITS AIR FORCES BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE AIR FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN UNILATERALLY REDUCED BY ITS ALLIES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE 50 PERCENT RULE ALSO COVERED THE REINFORCEMENT OF AIR FORCES. ONE MIGHT ASSUME THAT SOME STATE, AS THE RESULT OF UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR AIR FORCES BY ITS ALLIES, WHILE OBSERVING THE 50 PERCENT RULE MIGHT INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ITS AIR FORCES, THUS EXCEEDING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF AIR FORCES WHICH IT HAD PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT. SUCH AN INCREASE WOULD BE PERMITTED, HOWEVER, ONLY IF THE TOTAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ITS GROUND FORCES PLUS THE INCREASED NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ITS AIR FORCES IN SUM DID NOT EXCEED THE TOTAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES IT HAD PRIOR TO THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES. IF, HOWEVER, THIS TOTAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH EXCEEDED THE TOTAL FORCE STRENGTH THIS COUNTRY HAD PRIOR TO THE REDUCTIONS, THEN THIS STATE WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES, SO THAT THE INCREASED NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ITS AIR FORCE AND THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ITS GROUND FORCES TAKEN TOGETHER WOULD NOT AGAIN AMOUNT TO THE TOTAL FORCE STRENGTH IT HAD PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS, OR EVEN EXCEED THIS STRENGTH.

63. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WOULD NOT ONLY FOLLOW FROM THE PROPOSAL OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS OF 8 JUNE, IT ALSO CORRESPONDED TO THE BASIC IDEA OF THE POSITION OF WESTERN STATES, WHICH PROVIDED THAT UNDER THE COLLECTIVE CEILING AN INCREASE OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

OF AIR FORCES BEYOND THE ADMITTED LEVEL WOULD BE POSSIBLE
ONLY BY MEANS OF A CORRESPONDING REDUCTION OF THE
NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES.

64. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC
GROUP, US DEPREP SAID THAT WESTERN REPS NOW HAD SOME
QUESTIONS ON EASTERN DATA. FIRST, THEY NOTED THAT ON
JUNE 27, AMBASSADOR TARASOV HAD SAID THAT QUOTE EASTERN
REPS COULD NOT AGREE WITH A SITUATION OF A KIND WHERE
WARSAW TREATY SERVICE SUPPORT COMMANDS AND UNITS SUCH AS
FIRE BRIGADES AND MILITARY BANDS WOULD BE ALLOCATED TO
COMBAT UNITS UNQUOTE. WESTERN REPS DID NOT UNDERSTAND
PRECISELY WHAT THIS STATEMENT REFERRED TO. THEY ASSUMED
AMBASSADOR TARASOV HAD BEEN REFERRING TO THE TYPES OF
UNITS AND COMMANDS DESCRIBED IN LIST A WHICH THE WEST HAD
GIVEN EASTERN REPS. HOWEVER, WESTERN REPS DID NOT SEE HOW
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ANY OF THE LISTS WHICH THEY HAD GIVEN EASTERN REPS ON JUNE 13
COULD BE INTERPRETED AS ALLOCATING WARSAW TREATY SERVICE
SUPPORT COMMANDS AND UNITS SUCH AS FIRE BRIGADES AND
MILITARY BANDS TO QUOTE COMBAT UNITS UNQUOTE. LIST C WHICH
THE WEST HAD GIVEN EASTERN REPS MERELY SHOWED THE WEST'S
UNDERSTANDING, BASED ON EASTERN STATEMENTS, OF THE UNITS,
SUBUNITS, FORMATIONS, AND COMMANDS WHOSE PERSONNEL THE EAST
HAD ALLOCATED TO THE CATEGORY OF MAJOR FORMATIONS. WESTERN

REPS HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THE CATEGORY OF MAJOR FORMATIONS TO BE COMPRISED ONLY OF COMBAT UNITS, NOR HAD THEY UNDERSTOOD ON THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION PRIOR TO AMBASSADOR TARASOV'S REMARKS JUST CITED, THAT ALL SOVIET COMBAT UNITS HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE CATEGORY OF MAJOR FORMATIONS. THE WEST'S FIRST QUESTION WAS, HAD ANY SOVIET COMBAT UNITS BEEN INCLUDED IN THE SECOND CATEGORY?

65. TARASOV SAID, IN REPLY, IN THE WESTERN LISTS B AND C, WESTERN REPS ENUMERATED DIFFERENT UNITS AND SUBUNITS WHICH THE WEST HAD DIVIDED BETWEEN COMBAT UNITS AND COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS. EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY TOLD WESTERN REPS THAT UNITS, SUBUNITS AND COMMANDS SERVING ARMIES HAD BEEN INCLUDED BY THE EAST IN THE FIRST CATEGORY. IT WAS QUITE NATURAL THAT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS, IT WOULD BE INJUSTIFIED TO CALL THOSE UNITS AND SUBUNITS WHICH THE EAST HAD ALLOCATED TO THE FIRST CATEGORY COMBAT UNITS. WESTERN REPS WERE ASKING EASTERN REPS TO CONFIRM THE STRUCTURE OF THEIR FORCES WHICH WAS SET FORTH BY THE WEST IN LIST B AND C. IN LIST C, ALL UNITS WERE ALSO DIVIDED BETWEEN COMBAT UNITS AND COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THIS DIVISION DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THE ACTUAL NATURE OF UNITS AND SUBUNITS ALLOCATED TO THE FIRST CATEGORY, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THESE UNITS COMPRISED BESIDES THEIR COMBAT

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ELEMENTS, COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS, EASTERN REPS HAD TOLD WESTERN REPS IN THE LAST SESSION THAT THEY COULD NOT CONFIRM OR REJECT THESE LISTS. EASTERN REPS TOOK THIS POSITION, NOT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO ANSWER WESTERN QUESTIONS, BUT RATHER THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW THAT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF METHODOLOGY, THESE LISTS WERE COMPOSED INCORRECTLY. IN THEIR PREVIOUS ANSWERS, EASTERN REPS HAD STATED THAT, IF THE WEST WAS INTERESTED IN THE EAST'S DIVISION OF ITS FORCES BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND CATEGORIES

,
EASTERN REPS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ANSWER WESTERN QUESTIONS CONCERNING SUCH SPECIFIC UNITS.

66. US DEP REP SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE A BRIEF COMMENT ON THESE LISTS. AS WAS INDICATED ON LIST B, THE WEST HAD COMPILED THIS LIST FROM EARLIER STATEMENTS FROM EASTERN REPS. LIST C REPRESENTED THE WEST'S UNDERSTANDING AS TO WHICH SOVIET UNITS THE EAST HAD INCLUDED IN THE FIRST CATEGORY. IF THERE WAS A MISTAKE HERE, THAT IS, IF SOME UNIT LISTED ON LIST C DID NOT BELONG TO THE FIRST CATEGORY OF SOVIET FORCES, THEN THE EASIEST PROCEDURE WOULD BE FOR THE EAST TO INFORM THE WEST AS TO WHICH SOVIET UNITS DID NOT BELONG IN THE FIRST CATEGORY. IN THIS ENTIRE

PROCESS OF QUESTIONS ABOUT ALLOCATION BETWEEN MAJOR FORMATIONS
AND OTHERS, THE WEST WAS ONLY TRYING TO ALIGN ITS DATA ON
SOVIET FORCES IN THE SAME WAY AS THE EAST IN ORDER TO HAVE A
BETTER BASIS FOR A COMPARISON.

67. TARASOV SAID PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT NOW DEALING WITH THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THESE LISTS HAD BEEN CORRECTLY
COMPOSED BY WESTERN REPS ON THE BASIS OF PREVIOUS STATEMENTS
BY EASTERN REPS. NEITHER WERE EASTERN REPS DEALING NOW
WITH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE WESTERN UNDERSTANDING OF THE
DIVISION OF THESE UNITS AND SUBUNITS BETWEEN MAJOR FORMATIONS
AND FORCES OTHER THAN THOSE IN MAJOR FORMATIONS WAS CORRECT.
AT THIS POINT, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO ATTRACT THE ATTENTION

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OF WESTERN REPS TO THE FACT THAT, IF PREVIOUSLY THERE WERE
USED SUCH TERMS AS COMBAT FORCES, COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES
AND SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES, NOW, AFTER THE EAST HAD AGREED
TO DIVIDE ALL UNITS AND SUBUNITS INTO TWO CATEGORIES IN

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED CRITERIA, THE DIVISION OF UNITS AND SUBUNITS INTO COMBAT UNITS, COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS HAD BECOME UNJUSTIFIED. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT ALLOCATE TO COMBAT FORCES THOSE FORCES WHICH COMPRISED IN ADDITION TO COMBAT ELEMENTS VARIOUS SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS.

68. US DEP REP SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE ONE FURTHER COMMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. THE PROBLEM FOR EASTERN REPS APPARENTLY HAD TO DO WITH THE HEADINGS CONTAINED ON LIST C: COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT. US DEP REP WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE USE OF THESE HEADINGS DID NOT REPRESENT AN EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE WEST TO DIVIDE THE CATEGORY OF MAJOR FORMATIONS INTO SUBGROUPINGS. THE USE OF THE HEADINGS WAS MERELY INTENDED AS A GUIDE TO THE TYPE OF UNITS LISTED UNDER EACH OF THEM. IF IT WAS MORE CONVENIENT FOR EASTERN REPS TO READ THE LIST WITHOUT HEADINGS, THEN THEY SHOULD DO SO.

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69. US DEP REP STATED THAT THE WEST'S SECOND QUESTION WAS AS FOLLOWS: THE WEST UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE SOME GUARD UNITS AND SUBUNITS OF THE ARMY OF THE GDR WHICH WERE NOT SUBORDINATE TO MILITARY DISTRICTS. WESTERN REPS WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THE PERSONNEL OF THESE UNITS AND SUBUNITS HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE EAST'S FIGURES FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE SECOND CATEGORY? THE WEST'S THIRD QUESTION WAS: WERE THERE ANY ENGINEER, ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION, RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT UNITS AND SUBUNITS IN THE FORCES OF THE GDR, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WHOSE PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH THEY WORE UNIFORMS, CARRIED WEAPONS AND WERE SUBJECT TO MILITARY DISCIPLINE, HAD BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THE EAST'S FIGURES ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS: (A) THAT THEY WERE SUBORDINATE TO MINISTRIES OTHER THAN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, OR (B) BECAUSE THEY PERFORMED MISSIONS IN THE FIELD OF INTERNAL SECURITY, BORDER SECURITY, OR PUBLIC WORKS? IN ASKING THIS QUESTION, WESTERN REPS DID NOT HAVE IN MIND THE CONSCRIPT PERSONNEL OF THE POLISH UNITS OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE ABOUT WHICH THE WEST HAD ALREADY ASKED THE EAST A QUESTION WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN ANSWERED.

70. US DEP REP SAID THAT FOURTH, HAD THE WARSAW PARTICIPANTS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTRODUCTION INTO THE AREA BY WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS OF AIRCRAFT AND OTHER EQUIPMENT WHICH WAS MORE MODERN AND TECHNOLOGICALLY SOPHISTICATED? FIFTH, HAD THE POLISH MILITARY POLICE UNIT, WHICH THE WEST UNDERSTOOD WAS NOT SUBORDINATE TO A MILITARY DISTRICT, BEEN

INCLUDED IN THE EAST'S COUNT IN THE SECOND CATEGORY OF
"OTHER THAN MAJOR FORMATIONS"?

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71. US DEP REP SAID THE WEST'S LAST TWO QUESTIONS IN THE PRESENT SESSION WERE MORE GENERAL IN NATURE. THEY REFERRED TO PAST EASTERN ACTIONS WHICH WESTERN REPS WERE STILL NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND FULLY BECAUSE THESE ACTIONS CONTINUED TO APPEAR TO WESTERN REPS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE DATA WHICH THE EAST HAD TABLED. THEREFORE, WESTERN REPS WOULD WELCOME WHATEVER FURTHER CLARIFICATION THE EAST COULD PROVIDE WITH REGARD TO THESE ACTIONS.

72. US DEP REP STATED THAT THE WEST'S SIXTH QUESTION WAS THIS: ACCORDING TO EASTERN ACCOUNTS, EASTERN AUTHORITIES HAD CONSIDERED AT THE OUTSET OF THESE TALKS THAT THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF WARSAW TREATY FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WAS APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS THE FIGURES WHICH THE EAST HAD TABLED IN 1976. THEREFORE, WESTERN REPS STILL COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY EASTERN AUTHORITIES HAD WAITED UNTIL 1978 TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER AND EQUAL CEILINGS. THE WEST'S QUESTION WAS, COULD EASTERN REPS EXPLAIN WHY THE EASTERN AUTHORITIES NOT ADOPTED THE SAME POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THESE TALKS IN 1973 ON THESE TWO POINTS AS THEY HAD DONE NOW, IN 1978?

73. US DEP REP SAID THAT THE WEST'S SEVENTH QUESTION WAS, IF, AT THE OUTSET OF THESE TALKS, EASTERN AUTHORITIES HAD CONSIDERED THT THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WAS APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS THT REFLECTED IN THE FIGURES WHICH THE EAST HAD TABLED IN 1976, WHAT HAD EASTERN AUTHORITIES HAD IN MIND IN INSTRUCTING WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS TO SEEK IN THE SPRING OF 1976 THE DELETION FROM THE EASTERN FIGURES OF A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL PERFORMING FUNCTIONS WHICH THE EAST HAD STATED WERE PERFORMED BY CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE WEST? HAD EASTERN AUTHORITIES HAD IN MIND, AFTER SUPPLYING EASTERN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS, ACCEPTING

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

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A CEILING ON WARSAW TREATY MILITARY MANPOWER WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY BELOW THAT OF THE WEST--ACCORDING TO SOME BILATERAL EASTERN COMMENTS, BY ABOUT 100,000 MEN? IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS QUESTION, WESTERN REPS HAD IN MIND EASTERN STATEMENTS LIKE THAT MADE BY AMBASSADOR STRULAK IN THE JUNE 29 PLENARY, WHEN AMBASSADOR STRULAK HAD SAID QUOTE THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE MADE IT CLEAR ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT THEY ARE NOT SEEKING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONTRACTUALIZE A RELATIONSHIP OF INFERIORITY OR SUPERIORITY FOR ANY PARTY. UNQUOTE.

74. IN COURSE OF PRESENTATION OF LAST QUESTION, TARASOV ASKED US DEP REP TO GIVE DETAILS ON STATEMENT BY EASTERN REPS. (FOLLOWING SESSION, US DEP REP TOLD TARASOV THAT THE STATEMENT IN QUESTION HAD BEEN BILATERAL AND MADE OUTSIDE OF THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INFORMAL SESSIONS. HOWEVER, EASTERN REPS HAD MADE NUMEROUS CLAIMS IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS THAT THE WEST HAD OVER 300,000 CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND AT LEAST ONE EASTERN REP HAD IN AN INFORMAL SECRET

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SESSION STATED THAT MOST OF THESE 300,000 PERSONNEL PERFORMED FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE EAST.)

75. TARASOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN DATA. AS IT FOLLOWED FROM THE WESTERN REPLY GIVEN ON 22 FEBRUARY 1977 AND 15 MARCH 1977, THE WEST HAD NOT INCLUDED IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WESTERN STATES THOSE RESERVISTS WHO SERVED IN THE ARMED FORCES FOR SHORT PERIODS BUT RATHER HAD COUNTED ONLY THOSE RESERVISTS WHO WERE PERMANENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY. EASTERN REPS WISHED TO CLARIFY WHAT WAS MEANT UNDER THE

CATEGORY OF RESERVISTS WHO WERE PERMANENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY?
WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE RESERVISTS AND ACTIVE
DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL?

76. TARASOV SAID THE EAST'S SECOND QUESTION WAS,
AS WAS KNOWN, IN THE FRG ARMED FORCES, THERE WAS A
SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF POSITIONS WHICH WERE PERMANENT,
THAT IS, CONTINUALLY TAKEN BY THE STANDBY READINESS, THAT IS,
THE VERFUGUNGSBEREITSCHAFT. EASTERN REPS WISHED TO KNOW
WHETHER THESE PERSONNEL HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE WESTERN
FIGURES, AND IN WHICH CATEGORY OF GROUND OR AIR FORCES THEY
HAD BEEN COUNTED? IN ADDITION, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO
ASK WHETHER THERE WERE SUCH MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE ARMED
FORCES OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

77. TARASOV SAID HIS NEXT QUESTION WAS, ON APRIL 3,
1978, THE US REP HAD CLARIFIED THAT PERSONNEL OF THE
HELICOPTER UNITS ASSIGNED TO ARMY CORPS HAD BEEN INCLUDED
IN THE FIRST CATEGORY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS STATED
IN CONNECTION WITH THE BELGIUM AND NETHERLANDS THAT
PERSONNEL OF THE HELICOPTER UNITS HAD BEEN COUNTED ONLY IN
THE FIGURES FOR THE FIRST CATEGORY. EASTERN REPS WISHED
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TO KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD BE CORRECT TO CONCLUDE THAT
ALL HELICOPTER UNITS IN THE GROUND FORCES IN BELGIUM AND
THE NETHERLANDS HAD BEEN COUNTED IN THE FIRST CATEGORY
IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO ARMY
CORPS OR NOT?

78. TARASOV SAID HIS FOURTH AND FINAL QUESTION WAS,
IN REPLY TO THE GDR REP'S SECOND QUESTION OF JUNE 20,
WESTERN REPS HAD UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY THAT THIS QUESTION
REFERRED TO THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES. EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED WESTERN
REPS WHETHER WESTERN REPS COULD SAY ON WHICH OF THE
WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES THERE EXISTED A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN
EASTERN FIGURES SUBMITTED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND
WESTERN ESTIMATES OF THE MANPOWER STRENGTH OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND
WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF SUCH DISCREPANCY. EASTERN REPS WERE ASKING
THIS QUESTION ONCE AGAIN SINCE THEY BELIEVED THAT THE
ANSWER TO IT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO IDENTIFYING THE REASONS
FOR THE DISCREPANCY IN FIGURES.

79. THE SESSION WAS CONCLUDED. THE NEXT SESSION WILL BE
JULY 11, 1978. THE EAST WILL BE HOST.DEAN

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